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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents the costs of sequential and parallel 
research strategies in multiproject R.&D. characterised by 
spillovers between the projects. Larger spillovers associa-
ted with a sequential strategy prove to be insufficient to 
guarantee a cost advantage for this option. This provides a 
rationale for a parallel research strategy with some dupli-
cation of effort, as observed in some real world R.&D.-en-
vironments. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a paper on the optimal research strategy for a 
multiproject innovator. The R.&D.-process has a time 
dimension and externalities exist between the different 
projects on the agenda. The available options are sequential 
or parallel completion of the projects. With sequential 
research the innovator fackles only one project at the time. 
After the completion of a project, knowledge useful in the 
completion of the next one becomes available. With parallel 
research the innovator tackles both projects simultaneously. 
Knowledge overflows from one project on the other 
(spillovers) now realise immediately. As the full extent to 
which results from one project can be used for the 
completion of another only becomes clear after a while, some 
unnecessary duplication is inherent to parallel research. 
Hence the total amount of spillovers with parallel research 
is smaller than with sequential research. 
We essentially show that this spillover advantage for a 
sequential strategy can be outweighted if knowledge 
accumulation is characterised by diminishing returns to time 
compression (Scherer ( 1967), Mansfield ( 1968)). This even 
holds for the extreme case in which no externalities between 
the projects exist under parallel research. Such a situation 
arises in international pharmaceutical drug development 
where parallel complete duplication of tests (knowledge) 
sometimes wi 11 be less expensive than sequential partial 
duplication. This odd result illustrates the main point of 
this paper: in reaching a conclusion regarding the optimal 
R. &D. -strategy, a comparison of the total effort required 
will be often misguiding. The appropriate criterion is to be 
found in the costs of each strategy, which incorporate the 
dynamic features inherent to any R.&D.-process. 
THE COSTS OF MULTIPROJECT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. 
In this section we derive the costs of completing two R.&D.-
projects, both with a sequential and a parallel strategy. We 
then compare the costs and show under what conditions the 
spillover benefit of sequential research is insufficient to 
guarantee a cost advantage. Finally a specific case rele-
vant to the pharmaceutical industry is studied. 
Let y(t) be the R.&D.-expenditures at time t, and let x(t) 
stand for the cumulative knowledge reached on the project by 
t. The total knowledge required is A. The increase in 
knowledge x(t) and the R.&D-expenditures are related byl> 
1 
x'(t) = ya(t) (1a) x(Ol = 0 (1b) xm =A (ic) 
where 0 < a < 1, reflecting the assumption of diminishing 
returns to spending money faster. As (la) indicates, the 
knowledge acquired in a period of time increases less than 
proportionally with increases in the research outlays for 
that period. In the production relation ( la) ( lc), the 
completion date T by which an amount of knowledge A has been 
accumulated, can be viewed as the output. Then a cost 
minimising innovator will keep total discounted expenditures 
as small as possible while reaching A, or put formally he 
will solve (with r the discount rate) 
T 
mln r e -rty[t)dt (2) 
y(t) 0 
s.t. (la) - (lc) 
It has been shown (Kamien and Schwartz ( 1972)) that the 
solution to this program is: 
A(Arr)i/n 
C(T;A} = (3) 
(errT_0 un 
where C(T;A) is the least cost for completing an R.&D.-
project requiring an amount of knowledge A within a period 
of length T, and where n = a/(1-a). A detailed derivation of 
a similar result is given below when we consider parallel 
research. 
Now consider an innovator tackling two projects having 
completion dates T1 and T2 resp., and requiring resp. the 
amounts of knowledge A1 and A2. Without loss of generality, 
we assume T1 < T2. The innovator tackles these projects 
simultaneously. When he has reached A1 at T1, this not only 
enables him to introduce the first invention, but this also 
provides him with a useful amount of knowledge B, for the 
completion of the second project. He therefore faces only 
the effort A2-B, and has a T2-T1 period of time to come up 
with it. Formally, the cost function for sequential research 
will solve the program 
Ti T2 
min ( I e -rty 1 (t)dt + I e -rty2 (t)dt ) (4) 
Y1'Y2 0 T1 
2 
The method developped by Kamien and Schwartz (1972) to solve 
problem (la)-(2), can be applied to (4)-(6c) in a straight-
forward way. We then obtain 
Equation (7) can also be found by simply substituting the 
appropriate efforts and completion times in the cost 
function displayed in expression (3). This follows from the 
possibility to decompose problem (4)-(6c) in two problems, 
each formally equivalent with problem (1)-(2). 
Consider again the innovator tackling two projects having 
completion dates T1 and Tz and requiring efforts A1 and Az. 
But now he follows a parallel research strategy, i.e. both 
projects are done simultaneously. From the donor project 
knowledge overflows (spillovers) contribute immediately to 
the completion of the receptor project. The donor project is 
identified as the one with the earliest completion date. The 
total amount of spillovers accumulated up to T1 is assumed 
smaller than the one-shot lump sum spillover B, incurred at 
T1, when following a sequential strategy. 
The problem for the multiproject innovator then can be 
formulated as follows: 
Ti T2 
m1n ( J e"\ (t)dt + f erty2(t)dt } (8) 
Y1'Y2 0 0 
a 
G.t. x'1 <tl = y 1 ttl r9a> x 1 rol = o C9bl x1 rr 1 l l9cl 
a 
x2 ttl = y 2 ttl + qxi ttl u Oa} ~ rm = o u Obl x2 rr 2l = ~ liOd 
where q now denotes the spillover proportional to knowledge 
reached on the first project 
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One now can show: 
J.'E~PC?.~~~-~~rt. .. l: The cost function for the parallel research 
strategy to complete 2 innovations with com-
pletion dates T1 resp. T2 and efforts A1 and 
Az. is 
1/n 1/n 
Ai (A1rr) (A2-qA1)[{A2-qA1lnrl 
CIT i'T 2;A1'Azl - + ------ (11} 
T 1/n (err 1 - 1) T 1/n (enr 2- 1) 
Proof: 
The problem of finding an optimal path from 0 to Tz is 
decomposed in finding an optimal path from 0 to T1 and an 
optimal path from T1 to Tz given that the initial conditions 
of the latter form the endpoint conditions of the first, and 
need to be determined in an optimal way. The strategy is to 
start with the problem of reaching Tz optimally assuming 
that one arrived already optimally in T1 (part a). This 
yields a cost function in the remainder of time Tz-Tl, to 
acquire the remainder of know 1 edge Az -S, where S is the 
optimal amount of knowledge reached on the second project at 
T1. Then we solve from 0 to T1 and include this cost 
function as a salvage value (part b). This enables us to 
determineS explicitely, so as to obtain expression (11). 
Part a) Solving the program 
Tz 
rrunf e-rty2(t)dt (12) Yz r1 
yields a cost function 
(14} 
for (l2)-(l3c) has the same structure as (la)-(2). 
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s.t. (9a), (9b) arrl (9c) 
s.t. (10a),(10b) arrl (13b) 
We proceed by forming the Hamiltonian 
-rt a a a 
H = -e [y 1 {t} + y2!t)J + p1 (t) y i (t) + ,u2!t)[y2 (t) + qy i [t)J U 7) 
and derive following 
conditions (Seierstad 
Schwartz (1981)). 
necessary and also 
and Sydsaeter (1977), 
a-1 a-1 ~ 
1 
= -e-rt + J.li (t)ay 1 (t) + ,u2(t)aqy2 (t) = 0 (18) 
a-1 
HY
2 
= -e-rt + ,~~2 rtlay2 (tl =0 (19) 
-)J11(t) E H = 0 (20) 
xi 
xziTtl- qAi ~ 0 (23) 
a:rr r T 1 ;AtSl !x2IT 1l- qA1l {Jlz!t)+ l (24) 
cf) 
sufficient 
Kamien and 
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From (20) and (21) it is clear that ~l and ~2 are constants. 
Condition (22) has the following interesting economic 
in t e rp r e t a t i on: i f t he shadow cos t of know l edge for t he 
second project before the completion of the first exceeds 
the marginal cost of adding knowledge after completion (~2 > 
BC/BS), the amount of knowledge reached on the second 
project at T1 will be equal to the total amount of 
spillovers qA1. Intuitively it is clear that it will not be 
optimal to spent on research before T1 if the resulting 
knowledge can be added more cheap 1 y 1 at er on. Converse 1 y, 
whenever there has been spending for research we have (22l 
holding with equality, a condition that will be useful in 
determining the optimal S. 
We now derive the costs associated with the earliest project 
by starting from (18) and writing: 
a e-rt a/a-1 
Ytltl = (--. -~ 
{J.I1 + .Uzq}a 
(25) 
From the boundary conditions we have 
T 1 T 1 a T i a/a-1 
f xi (t)dt = f y 1 (t)dt = f (ert~ 1 +Jltpal dt 
0 0 0 
=-------
rr 
from which an expression for ~1 + ~2q can be obtained, which 
after use in (25) yields 
rt/1 1/a T -1/a Y 1 (t) = e -a (A! nr) (err 1 · 1) {26) 
This in turn can be used to obtain the cost function for the 
first project as 
(27) 
We proceed by deriving the costs for working on the second 
project before T1. Together with the cost for the work done 
after T1, as obtained in part a), they constitute the entire 
cost for the last project. Taking up at (19) we write 
(28) 
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Further, from the boundary conditions, 
T 1 T1 
s : Xz rr 1) - x2 {0) = J x2 (t)dt = J lJ2 (t) -+-~ (I.} ]dt 
0 0 
or 
from which we obtain 
}J2 = 
1/n rrT -1/n [(S-qA1)rr] (e 1-1) 
a 
(29) 
Expression (29) serves a double purpose. First it can be 
used to eliminate ~2 in (28), and second, in equation with 
the RHS of (22) it enables us to determinate S. Starting 
with the last task we have from equating (22) with (29) 
n 
--T--T--ri/-r-n = T 1/n 
(err 2 - err 1l a(err 1 - 1} 
which can be rearranged into 
S::-{- ~2 +_i_qAi (30) 
1+{ 1+{ 
where ------={ (3i) 
(errT 2 _ 9rrT 1) 
Expression (30) shows that the amount of knowledge reached 
by the second project at the finishing date of the first is 
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a weighted average between the total knowledge needed, and 
the knowledge spillover from the first project. The weights 
are given by the discount factors for the first time period 
(0-Tl) and for the remaining time period (T2-T1), relative 
to the entire time period (0-T2). These discount factors 
incorporate both time preference (cfr. the discount rate r) 
and compression diseconomies (cfr. n). Note that for finite 
introduction times of the second project and non-
instantaneous completion of the earliest project, we have S 
> qA1 . 
Since by now we have expressions both for ~2 and S, we can 
start from raising both sides of (28) to the power 1/a and 
substituting for ~2 in order to obtain the optimal R.&D. 
expenditure path for research outlays on the second project 
before T1 as 
'I (t) = ert/1-a (~A )_.l/a{errT -1/a 2 lV 'f'"'t llrJ i - 1} (32) 
Integration of these expenditures appropriately discounted 
yi e 1 ds the costs for working on the second project before 
the completion of the first as 
In (14) and (33), S can be replaced by the expression in 
(30). Adding together this gives the entire costs for 
completing the second project. Together with (27) this gives 
the cost function for parallel research as 
Q.E.D. 
Whether the multiproject innovator will engage in sequential 
or parallel research now will depend on whether cs < CP (or 
vice versa). An explicit comparison of equations (7) aile! 
(11) shows that this depends on whether 
8 
) 
< (enrT 2 - 1) 
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(34) 
A comparison of the nominators of both sides of (34) 
indicates less effort with a sequential strategy for B > 
qA1 , as waiting prevents unnecessary dup 1 icat ion. The one 
shot lump sum spillover however takes place after 
introduction of the first innovation resulting in less time 
(T2-T1 viz. T2) to complete the second project, as reflected 
by the denominators. This directly illustrates the lila in 
point of the paper: while a silllple colllparison in terllls of 
total efforts (knowledge) accords an advantage to the 
sequential strategy (A2-B) < A2 -qA1), this is not necessary 
translated into a cost advantage. Only if inequality (35) 
holds, sequential research will be the best strategy. 
Basically this expression says that the relative advantage 
of sequential over parallel research i.e. ( B-qAl ) I ( A2 -qA1 ) 
has to be big enough to outweigh the time compression 
diseconomies associated with the shorter time period for 
completing the remaining effort. Indeed (35) is likely to be 
violated if the spillover advantage is small (too little) 
and/or the first introduction releasing the one shot 
spillover shortly preceeds the second (too late). 
We can also make this point graphically. Then we represent 
the different options in the cost-output (time)-space. Since 
the derived costs are decreasing and convex functions in the 
length of the completion period, and increase with knowledge 
required, the following picture is justified: 
c 
- t 
l 
l 
Point 1 gives the costs of completing the first project by 
T1. This one is the same for both strategies. Point 2 ~ives 
the costs for completing the second project following the 
parallel strategy while point 3 shows these costs following 
the sequential strategy. We find these costs on a curve 
lying below that of parallel research (recall we assume B > 
qA1), :t?_':!_~. only L = T2-T1 periods away from the origin, not 
T2! Given that the costs of generating a certain amount of 
knowledge increase more than proportionally as the available 
time span decreases, one can easily imagine the costs of 
sequential research being higher. This is the case for the 
situation displayed in figure 1. Of course, different values 
of the parameters underlying the R.&D.-proces and/or 
different introduction dates lead to different outcomes. 
Therefore a last issue to adress is: which are the 
characteristics of an R. &D. -environment in which parallel 
strategies thrive? As the costs for completing the first 
project are unaffected by the chosen option we can focus on 
the costs for the second project in answering this question. 
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For the purpose we define 
An increase in W will reflect a trend toward the choice of a 
parallel strategy for W is nothing else than the ratio of 
the costs of completing the second project with a sequential 
strategy over the same cost with a parallel strategy. A 
comparative static analyses reveals: 
Pr~_P._os it io~-~. Parallel research as compared with sequen-
tial becomes cheaper as there are decreases 
in the one shot sequential spillover B, in 
the discount· rate r, in the completion date 
of the second project T2, and as there are 
increases in the instanteneous parallel 
spi 11 overs q, in the effort needed to com-
plete the first project A1, in the effort 
needed to complete the second project A2 and 
in the introduction date of the first pro-
ject, T1 . 
Table 1: Comparative Statics: The relative cost of parallel 
vs. sequential research. 
Proof: 
Par. B q ~ "-2 r ~ T2 
Sign eN/h. - + + + - + + 
Rasul.t # 123 456 7 
By differentiation of W. 
All these results are intuitively clear. Results 1, 2 and 3 
follow from the fact that increasing the spillovers for one 
option reduces its' costs. Result 4 follows from the fact 
that an increase in A2 can be "spread out" over a larger 
period with parallel research than it can be with a 
sequential strategy, so that the resulting compression 
diseconomies will be bigger for this strategy. An increase 
in the discount rate raises the cost of money spent early. 
As one immediately starts spending on the second project 
under a parallel strategy, hence result 5. Finally results 6 
and 7 follow from resp. squeezing and loosening the period 
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T2 -Tl in which A2 -B has to be done. As T1 increases this 
period is shortened resulting in more important time 
compression diseconomies. As T2 increases the opposite holds 
for more time becomes available. 
Consider the institutional background of international 
pharmaceutical R.&D. If a drug innovator plans clinical 
testing in a country, he has to submit first the results of 
other research, e.g. on pharmacokinetics and toxicology. 
Usually the results of research conducted abroad wi 11 be 
accepted for this purpose. This is not the case for clinical 
trials which often need to be done by local experts (IFPMA 
(1975)). But several regulatory requirements delay the 
transfer of foreign test results and by the same token 
belate the local clinical trials. Without going into the 
institutional details of all the different laws regulating 
the introduction of a drug, we nevertheless offer following 
causes: 
- often a foreign licencing authority requires the results 
of domestic clinical trials before it allows to carry out 
the necessary local trials (IFPMA (1975)); 
- if the transfer is by means of expert testimonials or bi-
bliografies, the domestic registration certificate someti-
mes has to be attached (Royal Decree on the Registration 
of Drugs in Belgium (1975)) 4 >; 
- apart from regulatory requirements in the foreign country, 
as the two just mentioned, also domestic regulators can 
delay foreign testing, such as the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (U.S.A.) requiring that the new chemical entity 
has obtained a domestic IND-approval before it can be ex-
ported, even for testing purposes (U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1983)). 
In the sequel we assume that clinical drug testing abroad 
starting from domestic pharmacokinetic and toxicological 
knowledge is impossible as long as domestic registration 
hasn't been obtained. Thus market licencing authorities 
require that at least part of the tests are duplicated 
locally and delay the transfer of knowledge necessary to 
start local testing. 
To avoid such lags the innovator can create the necessary 
results to start clinical trials by local research on 
pharmacokinetics and toxicology. Then each result reached on 
the project before T1 will be an exact duplication of a 
spillover result becoming available on T1. Thus not only the 
tests which have to be done locally but also those that 
could have been transferred will be duplicated. Spillovers 
with parallel research now will be completely unexisting, 
not simply smaller in comparison to a sequential strategy. 
The question now is whether parallel complete duplication 
can be less expensive than sequential partial duplication. 
The situation described can be analysed in the above 
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framework by putting q = 0.· The equivalent of condition (35) 
necessary to guarantee a sequential strategy simply becomes: 
B (errT 2 - errT 1) 1/n+i 
-)(----1 
"'t. (errT 2 - 1) 
(36) 
As the inequality sign in (36) is reversed, and apparently 
this doesn't contradict any of the assumptions, parallel 
complete duplication becomes the cheapest strategy. 
In circumstances when (36) holds, the technology transfer 
takes place sequentially. This appears to be typical for 
German pharmaceutical enterprises who, as Heiduk (1981) 
shows, usually patent a molecule, develop it into a drug, 
introduce it domestically, registrate it abroad perhaps 
after some additional testing, and start exporting it to 
foreign affiliates distributing it. If the reverse 
conditions hold, we would expect enterprises to duplicate 
efforts in the countries in which the drug will be 
introduced. Such a pattern shows for France and Italy, 
countries that take extreme attitudes in disregarding the 
results from foreign tests. In these countries the 
affiliates of German pharmaceutical multinationals are fully 
integrated with research facilities and inland expertise, 
and they develop and manufacture the drug fully on their 
own 5 > • 
Also, as R. &D.-decentralisation can be associated with a 
larger amount of parallel complete duplication than R.&D.-
centralisation which typically will involve more of 
sequential partial duplication, we expect more overseas or 
foreign R. &D.-expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Recent empirical analyses has revealed such trends 
(Mansfield et al. (1928)). One of the observed relations was 
ait = -1.13 + 
(0.44) 
0. 7 3 Tt 
(0.34) 
+ 0.15 Qit 
(1.81) 
+ 0.004 Sit 
(3.09) 
+ 16.10 Di 
(5.41) 
with ai t the percentage of overseas R.&D. in the enterprise 
in a given year. 
Tt a time dummy variable for some years. 
Qit the percentage of foreign sales on the enterprise 
in a given year. 
Sit the sales of the enterprise in a given year. 
Di a dummy that equals 1 if the enterprise is a phar-
maceutical company, and 0 otherwise. 
As can be seen, the share of R.&D.-expenditures carried out 
overseas is explained by the importance of foreign sales, 
and strongly and significantly by a dummy variable for the 
pharmaceutical nature of the company. It then is important 
to know that decentralisation should not be seen as a 
response to legal limitations on the transfer of knowledge 
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only, but also as a result of the time compression 
diseconomies induced by regulatory lags. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 
Earlier work on the optimal allocation strategy for multiple 
R.&D. projects (Gittens (1972), Laska et al. (1972)) 
focussed on the stochastic characteristics of the process. 
If the success probabilities increase in the amount of 
resources devoted to the project, a sequential strategy has 
been identified as optimal. When these probabilities 
decrease, it is better to work simultaneously. In this 
paper, the optimal strategy for multi-project R.&D. was 
studied in view of the spillover characteristics of the 
proces. It was shown that in certain environments a strategy 
of simultaneous research with partial or even complete 
duplication of one's own efforts can be optimal. 
Recent work on spillovers focusses on the inappropriability 
disincentives to innovative activities induced by the 
involuntary dissemination of R.&D.-results. These knowledge 
overflows between rival enterprises are externalities at the 
level of the market and are called upon to justify public 
intervet ions to s t imul ate indus tries' dynamic performance 
(Hartwick (1984), Spence (1984)). Here we studied spillovers 
that exclusively exist between research projects completed 
by a single innovator. This type of spillovers doesn't 
exclude the other, but has entirely different public policy 
implications. 
If for example the creation of a new technology generates a 
lot of results that can be used for a future project, one 
cannot assume that enterprises don't take this into account. 
And this in turn implies that one cannot infer from the 
anticipated losses of a single project that an innovator 
intends to engage in predatory actions. This line of 
reasoning emerges in a recent analyses of the U.S. vs. 
I.B.M.-case (Pittman (1984)) 6 >. As similar future cases 
possibly also will call upon these intrafirm spillovers, and 
as they are likely difficult to quantify, we think it is 
important to know that these spillovers do not translate 
theirselves automatically into lower costs. 
Notes 
I) Following notational conventions are valid throughout 
the paper: 
- an accent after, rather than a dot above, a variable 
denotes its' differentiation w.r.t. time, e.g. 
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- the same holds for differentiation with respect to any 
other variable, which now will follow the function ex-
plicitely, e.g. 
&Vbyi = Hyi 
- in order to indicate par·tial differentiation the 6 of 
variational calculus is used. 
2) One can also view this spillover as proportional to the 
effort required for the first project and write. 
This is closer to the formulation 
parallel strategy, where we have 
qA1. One then assumes. 
II) q 
of spillovers with a 
that spillovers equal 
3) As we assume T1 < T2, this implies that spillovers go 
from project 1 to project 2. If we assume T1 > T2 and 
maintain the assumption that spillovers go from the 
project with the earliest completion date to the latest, 
we obtain cost functions which are symmetric with (11). 
One only has to interchange the subscipts l and 2. 
Mathematically nothing changes. If spillovers are asso-
ciated with one project, e.g. they go from project 2 on 
project 1, regardless the sequence of completion dates, 
and not vice versa, a solution with a mathematical 
structure different from (ll) will be obtained for the 
case T1 < T2. The fact that the amount of spillovers 
varies proportionally with the state of knowledge rea-
ched on the second project at T1 increases the complexity 
significantly. In this paper we will not explore this 
strand of research. 
4) Belgian authorities do not refuse foreign clinical data 
but rather make objections toward analytical and stabi-
lity data. A local control of analytical methods must 
demonstrate that they can be used (IFPMA (1975)). 
5) This might explain why affiliates of one enterprise some-
times end up with different drugs. As Heiduk (1981) 
notes: 
"These characteristics prove that affiliated companies 
of German pharmaceutical concerns in France and Italy 
are rather a reflection of the structure of the parent 
companies although in part with a different product 
sort imen t - whereas, in other countries, predominant 1 y 
partial functions are carried out". 
6) More precisely, Pittman (1984) says: 
"In any industry in which technological change in rapid, 
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the benefits of the development of a new product are li-
ke 1 y to inc 1 ude improvements in other products so 1 d by 
the firm and information which leads to the developmentof 
future products. These 'externalities' - external to the 
particular product line, internal to the firm are 
likely to be difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, a 
rational firm must take them into account in its 
investment planning, and an analyst testing for 
predatation must include them in the benefits of a 
program". The author argues that in the I.B.M.-case 
spillovers probably did not compensate the losses of the 
project, but dismisses predatory behavior for other 
reasons. 
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